A wide anticommunist arc: Britain, ASEAN, and Nixon's triangular diplomacy by NGOEI, Wen-Qing (WEI Wenqing)
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences 
9-2017 
A wide anticommunist arc: Britain, ASEAN, and Nixon's triangular 
diplomacy 
Wen-Qing (WEI Wenqing) NGOEI 
Singapore Management University, wqngoei@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons 
Citation 
NGOEI, Wen-Qing (WEI Wenqing).(2017). A wide anticommunist arc: Britain, ASEAN, and Nixon's triangular 
diplomacy. Diplomatic History, 41(5), 903-932. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3207 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. 
For more information, please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
w e n - q i n g n g o e i
“A Wide Anticommunist Arc”: Britain, ASEAN, and
Nixon’s Triangular Diplomacy*
In the October 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs, presidential aspirant Richard Nixon
exhorted his readers to pivot their gaze to the “rest of Asia.” The war in Vietnam, he
argued, had too long “distorted our picture of Asia”—it “filled the screen of our
minds; but it [should] not fill the map.” In Nixon’s view, the ongoing U.S. military
campaign inVietnamhad“divertedPeking” fromtargets suchas India,Thailand,and
Malaysia; it had “bought vitally needed time” for Southeast Asia’s leaders to rout
communist insurrections and to forge an “Asian regionalism” that contained Chinese
expansionism. He asserted that “all around the rim of China,” the pro-West nations
of Southeast Asia formed a geostrategic arc that stretched “from Japan to India,” an
arc fortified by “occidental Australia and New Zealand” and “linked by the sea” to the
UnitedStates.Heenvisionedthis arcwould“becomesostrong” thatChinamust seek
“dialogue” with the United States, whereupon he would subject the Chinese to “con-
tainment without isolation.”1 Five years later, as president, Nixon translated this
vision into triangular diplomacy with China and the USSR. He and Chinese leaders
issued the Shanghai Communique´ in February 1972 to begin the process of normal-
izing relations. Three months later, Soviet officials welcomed Nixon to Moscow for a
parallel resolution, hoping that de´tente with the United States might defuse the dual
threat of NATO to its west and China to its east. In effect, Nixon had taken full
advantage of what U.S. officials had envisioned since the early 1960s: “a wide antic-
ommunist arc” of allies “enclosing the entire South China Sea.”2
*The author would like to thank Diplomatic History’s anonymous reviewers, Michael Allen,
Daniel Immerwahr, Mark Atwood Lawrence, Chris Miller, Michael Sherry, and Jeffrey Winters
for their insights and suggestions. This article was made possible by research funding and support
from the Department of History at Northwestern University, the W. Stull Holt Dissertation
Research Fellowship from SHAFR, the Nicholas D. Chabraja Center for Historical Studies,
and the Rajawali Foundation at Northwestern University, the Chauncey Postdoctoral
Fellowship at Yale, and Start-Up Grant No. M4081896.100 from Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. The article adapts material from the author’s book, The Arc of
Containment: Britain, Malaya, Singapore and the Rise of American Hegemony in Southeast Asia,
1941–1976, forthcoming from Cornell University Press, Fall 2019.
1. Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs (October 1967): 111–112,
116, 123.
2. Memo from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, “Prospects for Malaysia,” September 5, 1962,
Personal Papers of James C. Thomson, Jr., box 22, general files 1961–1966, John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library (hereafter JFKL).
DiplomaticHistory,Vol. 41, No. 5 (2017).!The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University
Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.
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Nixon’s triangular diplomacy succeeded because the “wide anticommunist arc”
had largely confined the influence of both China and the USSR to the Indochinese
states. Indeed, Beijing and Moscow welcomed de´tente with Washington in order
to accommodate themselves to what they believed was de facto American hegemony
in Southeast Asia. I argue that the “wide anticommunist arc” that underpinned
U.S. hegemony in the region arose substantially from British policies toward
postcolonial Singapore and the pro-U.S. diplomacy of ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) leaders during the American war in Vietnam. As Britain
withdrew its military from Singapore between the late 1960s and early 1970s, it
created the FPDA (Five-Power Defense Arrangement) that entwined the defense
systems of Malaysia and Singapore with that of Australia, New Zealand, and itself,
albeit in a reduced role. The FPDA frustrated Soviet hopes of capitalizing on
Britain’s retreat from Singapore and the United States’ anticipated exit from
Vietnam. At the same time, ASEAN statesmen from Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand forged intimate economic and military re-
lations with the United States to resist Chinese influence and to strengthen their
hands against homegrown socialist forces inspired by Vietnam’s communist revo-
lution. In so doing, ASEAN leaders contained China and reinforced U.S. predom-
inance in the region. By the time Nixon initiated triangular diplomacy, most of
Southeast Asia resembled a U.S. neocolonial system. Chinese leaders embraced
Nixon’s offer of rapprochement as well as ASEAN’s formula for neutralizing
Southeast Asia to avoid further isolation. The Soviets, confronting the prospect
of Sino-U.S. amity, combined with their own failure to make inroads into
Southeast Asia, were likewise eager for de´tente with the United
States. Scholars have overlooked these broader patterns in the history of U.S.
empire in Southeast Asia. With one eye trained on the American debacle in
Vietnam; the other uponthe “shock of the global”1970s heralding an“age of limits”
for the United States, many historians take for granted that Nixon turned to de´tente
because of the U.S. government’s diminishing power abroad and at home.3 Jeremi
Suri has argued that de´tente was Nixon’s conservative response to the civil unrest
that had destabilized the U.S. government since the mid-1960s. To outflank do-
mestic dissent, Nixon executed dramatic displays of international cooperation with
likeminded conservative leaders in the USSR and China who also faced homegrown
resistance to their authority.4 According to Daniel Sargent, Nixon pursued de´tente
3. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our
Times (Cambridge, UK, 2005), 194–195. See also Niall Ferguson, ed., Shock of the Global: The 1970s
in Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 2010); Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of
the Working Class (New York, 2010); Natasha Zaretsky, No Direction Home: The American Family
and the Fear of National Decline, 1968–1980 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007) and Christopher Capozzola,
“‘It Makes You Want to Believe in the Country’: Celebrating the Bicentennial in an Age of
Limits,” in America in the 1970s, ed. Beth Bailey et al. (Lawrence, KS, 2004).
4. Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of De´tente (Cambridge, MA,
2003); Keith L. Nelson, “Nixon, Brezhnev, and De´tente,” Peace & Change 16 (1991): 197–219.
Although dated, Nelson’s article is similar to Suri’s arguments about the conservative impulses
underpinning de´tente between the USSR and the United States.
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to “stabilize the status quo” of the Cold War order and to stave off the “fracture and
disruption” unleashed by the “ascent of the market . . . widening social inequality . . .
[and] invigorated social, intellectual and political contestation.”5
Figure 1 (Map): In the October 1967 issue of Foreign Affairs, Nixon envisioned that the pro-
West nations of the Asia Pacific (shaded in the above map) formed a geostrategic arc “all around
the rim” of China. According to Nixon, the arc stretched “from Japan to India,” was anchored by
“occidental Australia and New Zealand,” and “linked by the sea” to the United States.
5. Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in
the 1970s (Oxford, UK, 2015), 9–10.
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Though the United States faced serious challenges to its predominance in
global affairs in the late 1960s, this article shows that Nixon undertook triangular
diplomacy with the benefit of de facto U.S. hegemony in Southeast Asia. For one,
the FPDA significantly, if unexpectedly, augmented the United States’ strategic
position against the USSR in Southeast Asia. Historians of American foreign re-
lations, though, have ignored the FPDA. And the scholars who focus on the FPDA
make few productive gestures at U.S. policy in Southeast Asia—they study instead
how the FPDA typified or changed the dynamics of British retrenchment or else
delve into its effects on the attitudes of policymakers in Britain, Australia, Malaysia,
and Singapore.6
The literature specifically concerned with Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia as
a region is sparse and dated.7 Despite acknowledging that the FPDA obstructed
Soviet leaders’ efforts to extend their influence in Southeast Asia, these works do not
probe further into how the FPDA shaped broader Cold War rivalries. These studies
all emphasize that Moscow’s involvement in Southeast Asia was a function of its core
objective in the global Cold War: promoting a Soviet-led world order that served as
an alternative to the capitalist system dominated by the United States and Western
powers. To this end, the USSR under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev (1953–
1964) and Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) attempted to “utilize the force of nation-
alism” across the decolonizing world. In Southeast Asia, Moscow thus eschewed any
doctrinaire support for communist revolutionaries (unless, as in Vietnam, they
evinced a realistic chance of success) and instead cultivated the region’s non-com-
munist nationalists with offers of Soviet economic and military aid. In this vein, the
USSR strove in the late 1960s to capitalize on both Britain’s decision to militarily
withdraw from Singapore and the United States’ waning commitment to Vietnam
and its regional clients, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia.8 But the FPDA, as
6. For the FPDA in British retrenchment, see Andrea Benvenuti, “The Heath Government
and British Defense Policy in Southeast Asia at the End of Empire (1970–71),” Twentieth Century
British History 20 (2009): 53–73. For the Australian response to British retrenchment, see Andrea
Benvenuti, “The British Military Withdrawal from Southeast Asia and its Impact on Australia’s
Cold War Strategic Interests,” Cold War History 5 (2005): 189–210; Andrea Benvenuti, “The
British are ‘Taking to the Boat’: Australian Attempts to Forestall Britain’s Military
Disengagement from Southeast Asia, 1965–1966,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20 (2009): 86–106;
and Andrea Benvenuti and Moreen Dee, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements and the
Reappraisal of British and Australian Policy Interests in Southeast Asia, 1970–5,” Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies 41 (2010): 101–123. For Malaysian and Singaporean views of the FPDA,
see Chin Kin Wah, The Defense of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System,
1957–71 (Cambridge, UK, 1983) and Ang Cheng Guan, “Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to
the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971,” War & Society 30
(2011): 207–225.
7. See Leszek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia (New York, 1986), R. A.
Longmire, Soviet Relations with South East Asia: An Historical Survey (New York, 1989); and
Bilveer Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN (Singapore, 1989). Charles B. McClane’s landmark
Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton,
NJ, 1966) does not cover the period discussed in this article.
8. Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 9–11, 13–14, 49–52, 74; Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN,
2–3.
906 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article-abstract/41/5/903/3090939/A-Wide-Anticommunist-Arc-Britain-ASEAN-and-Nixon-s
by Adam Ellsworth, Adam Ellsworth
on 12 October 2017
this article shows, dashed Soviet hopes of replacing the Anglo-American security
umbrella with one reliant upon the USSR. In particular, the FPDA’s first joint
exercise in 1970 so impressed Soviet officials with its scale that they came to think
(inaccurately, in fact) that Britain would never remove its military presence from
Southeast Asia and would continue to support U.S. policy in the region. The pro-
spect of enduring Anglo-American dominance in non-communist Southeast Asia
chilled Soviet leaders’ ambitions for the region and made them amenable to Nixon’s
triangular diplomacy.
The emergence of the FPDA also intertwined with Moscow’s sense that it had
lost the Sino-Soviet competition for influence over most of Southeast Asia’s com-
munists. As one scholar of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia notes, Moscow’s general
“policy of indifference” toward communist parties in Burma, Malaya, the
Philippines, and Thailand encouraged them to turn to China for political and
military assistance. Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s ideological predilection
toward armed revolution and readiness to support insurgencies won many
Third World communists away from the USSR, not just those in Southeast
Asia.9 Indeed, recent scholarship underscores the global proportions of the
Sino-Soviet conflict, contending that Moscow and Beijing’s competition for
Hanoi’s allegiance represented but one theater of an international “clash of . . .
two revolutionary programs, the [Chinese] anti-imperialist revolution and the
[Soviet] anti-capitalist one,” unfolding “at the nexus of the Cold War and decol-
onization.”10 The pro-Chinese orientation of Southeast Asia’s communists saw the
USSR vie more vigorously for the loyalty of the Vietnamese communists; it also
became more urgent for the Soviets to cultivate non-communist Southeast Asia.
The FPDA’s significance thus looms even larger. By the late 1960s, the USSR was
actually caught in two intersecting global rivalries, one against the West and the
other against what historian Jeremy Friedman terms the “shadow Cold War”
against China. Worse, the Soviet Union was losing ground in both.11 With the
success of Nixon’s rapprochement with China in early 1972, after the FPDA came
9. Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 13–14, 51; Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the
World since 1750 (New York, 2012), 346, 418–419; and Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War
(Chapel Hill, NC, 2001), 63–71.
10. Jeremy S. Friedman, Shadow Cold War: Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World (Chapel
Hill, NC, 2015), 1; Nicholas Khoo, Collateral Damage: The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination
of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance (New York, 2011); Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: The Cold
War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ, 2008).
11. Leszek Buszynski, “The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia since the Fall of Saigon,” Asian
Survey 21 (1981): 536–50; Muthiah Alagappa, “Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia: Toward
Constructive Engagement,” Pacific Affairs 63 (1990): 321–50; Michael C. Williams, “New
Soviet Policy toward Southeast Asia: Reorientation and Change,” Asian Survey 31 (1991):
364–77; Susanne Birgerson, “The Evolution of Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia:
Implications for Russian Foreign Policy,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 23 (1997): 212–34.
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into force in November 1971, Soviet leaders became eager to seek de´tente with the
United States.12
ASEAN statesmen, for their part, enabled the rise of American hegemony in
Southeast Asia at the expense of China’s regional ambitions. However, major
studies of American foreign relations argue that the United States’ retreat from
Vietnam represents the end of the “short-lived American empire” in Southeast
Asia.13 This article shows instead that ASEAN leaders, determined to secure U.S.
support for their authoritarian regimes, had so deepened their relations with the
United States during the 1960s that the overall pro-U.S. tilt of ASEAN outlasted
U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Soviet and Chinese sponsorship of their Vietnamese allies
had only gained the communist powers a few localized triumphs in Indochina.
To be sure, the most valuable recent scholarship on ASEAN diplomacy ob-
liquely ponders the fate of U.S. empire in the region while investigating the com-
plex and conflicting approaches that ASEAN leaders adopted toward the Vietnam
War.14 Even so, examining ASEAN leaders’ attitudes exclusively through the
prism of Vietnam obscures how the wide anticommunist arc in Southeast Asia—
regardless of internal tensions—convinced Chinese leaders of their nation’s stra-
tegic shortcomings vis-a`-vis the United States and U.S. allies. And like major
works of U.S. foreign relations with the same outsized focus upon Vietnam,
such analyses of Southeast Asian diplomacy maintain that ASEAN leaders were
disappointed by U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, shocked by Nixon’s rapproche-
ment with China, and had no choice but to fall in step with American policy.15 This
article revises this well-worn narrative with close attention to the underappreciated
agency of the ASEAN statesmen. For not only did the ASEAN leaders shore up
U.S. hegemony in Southeast Asia, they also directly influenced how Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai discussed the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations with
Nixon and U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. By revisiting
American and Chinese accounts of Sino-U.S. talks in 1971 and 1972, this article
illuminates what scholars have thus far ignored: that ASEAN leaders’ efforts in the
early 1970s to neutralize the region against the Cold War rivalry—proceeding
Nixon’s visit to China with diplomatic overtures to Zhou—underpinned the core
12. Nelson, “Nixon, Brezhnev, and De´tente,” 212–14; Telegram, Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 17, 1971, in Soviet-American Relations: The
De´tente Years, 1969–1972, ed. David C. Geyer et al. (Washington D.C., 2007), 401–404.
13. Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World
War II (New York, 1999), 221–22; Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine, Arc of Empire: America’s
Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC, 2012).
14. Ang Cheng Guan, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War (London, 2010), chaps. 4–5.
H-Diplo Roundtable Review Volume XI, No. 46: Ang Cheng Guan, Southeast Asia and the
Vietnam War, with commentaries by Anne L. Foster, Laura M. Calkins, Balazs Szalontai,
Nicholas Tarling, and Robert H. Taylor, http://www.h-net.org/diplo/roundtables/PDF/
Roundtable-XI-46.pdf, accessed March 18, 2016;
Even so, Ang’s work makes little contribution to the history of U.S. foreign relations toward
East and Southeast Asia during the Cold War, which is the principal focus of this article.
15. McMahon, Limits of Empire, 165–175; Ang, Southeast Asia, 94–95, 98–102.
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principles of the Shanghai Communique´ and the success of Nixon’s triangular
diplomacy.
BRITAIN ’S RETREA T, TH E F PD A, AND S OVIET A MBITIONS IN
SOUTH EAST A SIA
In mid-1965, British officials, calculating that their country’s sagging economy
could no longer sustain its global military commitments, believed that Britain must
focus on its European sphere of influence and vacate its air and naval complexes in
Singapore and the few that remained in Malaysia.16 Britain’s military bases, par-
ticularly those in Singapore, had been central to the fading Empire’s claim to great
power status after World War II. With more than 30,000 British troops, these
bases were second in magnitude only to the British Army on the Rhine, the 50,000
soldiers Britain had committed to NATO.17 But the cost of maintaining the
Singapore and Malaysia installations had ballooned to almost $200 million annu-
ally, far outstripping Britain’s earnings from holdings in either country.18 Under
intense pressure from their colleagues, Prime Minister Harold Wilson and
Defense Secretary Denis Healey felt forced to pull the British military from
Singapore.19
Without the Singapore bases, British leaders anticipated it would be difficult to
make substantial contributions to SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
in the future. Likewise, U.S. officials judged that Britain’s staging facilities on
Masirah and Gan, islands in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, were too
distant for the British military to make a sustained impact on the Cold War in
Southeast Asia.20 President Lyndon Johnson could only write Wilson with “dis-
may” in January 1968, bemoaning British plans to withdraw completely from
Singapore by 1971, leaving the United States to “man the ramparts all alone.”21
Apart from weakening SEATO, Britain’s retreat would also abrogate the
Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement, which since 1957 had obligated the
British to defend Malaysia as well as Singapore in the event of an external
attack. Wilson and Healey, hoping to preserve the last vestiges of Britain’s
global power, cast about for ways to “appease their Southeast Asian
16. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?
(London, 2002), 127–28.
17. Map of British Forces at Bases Overseas, undated, folder “United Kingdom: Memos, Vol.
13 [1 of 3],” box 212, National Security Files (hereafter NSF)—Country File (hereafter
CF)—United Kingdom (UK), Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereafter LBJL).
18. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, 127–28.
19. “Working Party on Singapore: Report to Ministers—OPD (65) 123,” August 31, 1965,
Colonial Office 968/838 (hereafter CO with reference numbers), National Archives of the UK
(hereafter TNA).
20. Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum: The Economy of the United
Kingdom After Devaluation, February 8, 1968, 7, 17–18, folder “United Kingdom: Memos,
Vol. 13 [1 of 3],” box 212, NSF-CF-UK, LBJL.
21. Letter, Rostow to The President, January 11, 1968, folder “United Kingdom Vol. 13 [2 of
3]”, Box 212, LBJ Papers, NSF-CF-UK, LBJL.
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Commonwealth partners”—Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand—
and “reassure [their] allies that [Britain] was not leaving the area defenseless.”
Wilson thus promised Malaysia and Singapore an air defense system, including
two large radar installations, about 100 military technicians to aid in their oper-
ation, several Rapier surface-to-air missiles, and training for Singapore’s pilots and
airbase technicians. The British government also pledged to buoy Singapore and
Malaysia with a regular share of the British foreign aid budget until the military
rundown was complete in 1971.22
More importantly, Britain planned to replace its military influence in Asia and
Oceania with the FPDA.23 In June 1968, British officials convened in Kuala
Lumpur with their counterparts from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and
Singapore to weave their defenses into a collective security framework.
American observers reported that the meeting “went off reasonably well.”
Australian leaders, after all, treated Malaysia and Singapore as vital “forward de-
fense” positions against the potential expansion of the Vietnam War into the wider
region.24 Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman concurred with
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that the FPDA was a necessity for
their nations—the departure of Britain’s military would leave both without sig-
nificant naval and air defenses.25 Malaysian and Singaporean officials thus agreed
to the joint use of each other’s air defense facilities to better coordinate operations
while Australia and New Zealand pledged to maintain forces in both peninsular
Malaysia and Singapore at least until 1971. The Kuala Lumpur conference lasted
only two days but all parties arranged to meet in Canberra the next year to hammer
out specifics, and to stage a joint military exercise in 1970 (the exercise was later
termed Bersatu Padu, Malay for “Complete Unity”) to test their capabilities with-
out British forces.26
Sufficient agreement between the five nations would see the FPDA come into
force in November 1971. But Britain’s allies probably felt they had no choice in the
matter. Calling the FPDA an arrangement between five powers was, furthermore,
22. Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Memorandum: Britain Begins Implementation of
Budget Cuts, February 6, 1968, 6, folder “United Kingdom: Memos, Vol. 13 [1 of 3],” box 212,
NSF-CF-UK, LBJL.
23. Chin, Defense, esp. chap. 9.
24. Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown
Regional Security Organization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27 (2005): 4.
25. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United
States and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge, UK, 2002), 160–61; Memorandum of a
Conversation (hereafter Memcon), March 8, 1966, 5, 8, folder “POL. Visits, Meetings.
Singapore 1966,” box 1, Subject Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
Affairs (hereafter SFOIMSA), 1965–1974, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG with reference num-
bers), National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter USNA); Carlyle A. Thayer, “The
Five Power Defense Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges 3 (2007): 81.
26. Briefing Memorandum “Malaysian Roundup,” July 11, 1968, 6, folder “E-1. General
Policy. Plans. Programs.1968,” box 1, SFOIMSA, 1965–74, RG 59, USNA. See also Chin Kin
Wah, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: Twenty Years After,” The Pacific Review 4 (1991):
193–203.
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a misnomer. It actually served as Britain’s exit strategy from Southeast Asia, leaving
behind four allies. Also, neither Malaysia nor Singapore could be considered a
“power.” Singapore could not even provide one ship for the naval maneuvers of
Bersatu Padu in 1970.27 Worse, the FPDA on paper asked little of its strongest
members. Should either Malaysia or Singapore face external aggression, FPDA
members were required only to consult each other on the appropriate action. In
fact, Britain had to go behind the scenes to coax Australia and New Zealand into
stationing large numbers of troops in Singapore and Malaysia because the FPDA
contained no such obligations.28 Fortunately for Britain, the Australian govern-
ment valued its alliance with the United States and the ANZUS (Australia, New
Zealand, and United States) security pact, which had been in place since 1951.
Thus, the Johnson administration had more success in prodding the Australians to
“take the lead” and “assume a larger role” in the security of Malaysia and Singapore
and, by extension, the FPDA. In equal measure, U.S. leaders managed to goad the
New Zealand government to embrace the arrangement.29 Regardless, Britain’s
diminishing military presence during Bersatu Pada would prove in broad daylight
that the FPDA had no bite and Britain’s Empire was truly finished in Southeast
Asia.
Yet, as Bersatu Padu unfolded in Malaysia’s jungles from April through June
1970, British politics took an unexpected turn. The Conservative Party led by
Edward Heath replaced the Wilson government in mid-June and promised a
modest military presence in the Far East. Heath and his colleagues were not con-
cerned with Malaysia and Singapore—they merely wished to reinforce Britain’s
relationships with Australia and New Zealand.30 According to one scholar, Heath
thought Britain’s “actual physical presence” in the joint exercise would confer
some “psychological benefits” upon its Commonwealth allies.31
Regardless of Heath’s intentions, Bersatu Padu suddenly swelled in size. A
British MovieTone newsreel from June 1970 boasted that Bersatu Padu was a
“giant.” Fifty warships, two hundred aircraft and 25,000 military personnel from
the five nations were involved. The newsreel dwelled on a Commonwealth aircraft
carrier knifing through the South China Sea and military helicopters clustering in
the skies. With sweeping aerial shots surveying Malaysia’s territory, the film sig-
naled that a dominant air force protected the nation. Britain’s 14,000 combat
27. Thayer, “Five Power,” 81.
28. Ralf Emmers, “The Role of the Five Power Defense Arrangements in the Southeast Asian
security architecture,” RSIS (Rajaratnam School of International Studies) Working Paper, no.
195, Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2, 7.
29. U.S. Position Paper: U.K. Withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore at the SEATO/ Seven
Nation/ ANZUS Meeting (Wellington, New Zealand), March 27, 1968, 3; Memcon, “Future
Australian Role in Malaysia/Singapore Security,” May 27, 1968, LBJL, Declassified Documents
Reference System (hereafter DDRS).
30. Thayer, “Five Power,” 81; Benvenuti and Dee, “Reappraisal of British and Australian
policy interests,” 102. See also Benvenuti, “Heath Government.”
31. Chin, Defense, 170–71.
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troops and servicemen were deployed directly from the United Kingdom to
Malaysia—over 7,500 miles—for the “largest peacetime airlift” the country had
ever attempted. According to the voiceover, Bersatu Padu targeted an “unnamed
country” in Southeast Asia that had been preparing for a “large scale attack” on
Britain’s allies. But the scenes of the British-Malaysian jungle warfare school,
Commonwealth military helicopters buzzing above Malaysia’s jungles, and sol-
diers rooting out “hostile forces and sympathizers” played by Malaysian and
Gurkha troops in faux village hideouts were clearly reminiscent of the American
war still raging in Vietnam. To jaunty music, the voiceover stated that Bersatu Padu
proved Britain was “not leaving an exposed flank.”32
Though Bersatu Padu appeared impressive to observers, the FPDA’s innate frail-
ties troubled its members to no end. The joint exercise was expensive. One scholar
states that Britain’s contribution alone ran upwards of $3million, but British officials
likely volunteered this misleading figure for the record since it excluded the tremen-
dous cost of British equipment as well as food and pay for its soldiers. Furthermore,
Bersatu Padu required overseas troops to undergo six weeks of acclimatization, as
well as the advance establishment of a Brigade headquarters, all of which cast doubt
upon the efficacy of such long-range emergency deployments. Knowing Britain was
determined to pull its military from the region, some Malaysian officials sneered that
the FPDA was simply a public relations exercise.33
Soviet leaders, though, took Bersatu Padu very seriously. In the years prior to the
exercise, Russian officials had already let slip their anxieties at being unable to
profit from Britain’s and the United States’ imminent military withdrawals from
Southeast Asia. The Russians vented their insecurities quite publicly. In March
1968, Izvestiya, the Soviet government’s national publication, protested that
Malaysia and Singapore, once the nodes of Britain’s military network, would
simply enter the U.S. sphere of influence in Southeast Asia.34 This scenario was
not far-fetched. As Britain’s exit proceeded two years later, U.S. Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird assured Nixon that since the United States had always
made “extensive use of Singapore’s naval logistical support facilities,” it would
continue to do so in the post-Vietnam era.35 Equally, several Soviet officials sus-
pected Britain’s retreat from Singapore was a mere feint. When Moscow received
confirmation in early 1969 that Britain planned to create the FPDA, Pravda—the




du&V_Year=1928&V_resultsPerPage=10, accessed September 22, 2016.
33. Chin, Defense, 172.
34. V. Skosyrev, “Kommivoyazher s Chuzhim Tovarom,” Izvestiya, March 15, 1968 quoted in
Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 50.
35. Memorandum, Laird to Nixon, undated (likely January 1970), folder “NSSM 31,” box
H-141, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (hereafter NPMS), National Security Council (here-
after NSC) Institutional (“H”) Files—Study Memorandums (1969–74), National Security Study
Memorandums (hereafter NSSM), Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter RMNL).
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official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—complained that the
arrangement enabled Britain to remain involved in Southeast Asia, buttressing
U.S. military power.36
These official Soviet statements were as much criticisms of Anglo-American
policy as manifestations of an underlying sense of inferiority on the Kremlin’s part.
True, the USSR had in Vietnam proven to the United States and its Western allies
that it could effectively support a proxy from afar.37 Nonetheless, Moscow re-
mained cognizant of the weak toehold that it had in the wider Southeast Asian
region. By the late 1960s, besides the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its
southern ally, the National Liberation Front, most of the Southeast Asian groups
carrying the communist bloc’s ideological convictions had been decimated by
anticommunist nationalists with American or British support. U.S. intelligence
officials, though their leaders despaired over Vietnam, concluded in November
1968 that “Communist parties in Southeast Asia [had] fared poorly,” that com-
munist insurgency now posed “less a threat in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and
the Philippines” than in the 1940s.38 Furthermore, most of the communist parties
of Southeast Asia tended to be pro-Chinese in their orientation, leaving the USSR
with precious little sway over their leaders and policies.39
Nonetheless, Moscow endeavored to enlarge its political presence in Southeast
Asia. In 1969, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev set about trying to win ASEAN
leaders’ acceptance of a Soviet-led collective security system, hoping to find
them receptive given the anticipated British and American retrenchment and the
prospect of Chinese hegemony. From June of that year, Brezhnev and his lieuten-
ants carried his proposal of collective security to the ASEAN states, only to have
these overtures fall flat.40 The virulently anticommunist Suharto regime of
Indonesia, fresh from annihilating the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) in a
bloody purge between 1965 and 1966, remained dead set against friendlier rela-
tions with the USSR and gravitated instead to the United States.41 The pro-U.S.
Thai government, apart from inking a trade agreement with the USSR at the end
of 1970, never warmed to the Soviet proposal and continued to host U.S. military
bases and troops. The Philippines, an ally of the United States well before the
onset of the Cold War, would not even establish relations with the USSR until
36. Erik Alekseev, “Zapasnyew Pozitsii,” Pravda, March 5, 1969 (quoted in Buszynski, Soviet
Foreign Policy, 50).
37. Westad, Global Cold War, 194.
38. Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate: Southeast Asia After
Vietnam, November 14, 1968, 3, CIA Freedom of Information Act (hereafter FOIA) Reading
Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_
0001166458.pdf, accessed July 14, 2016.
39. Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 13, 24.
40. Bilveer Singh, The Soviet Union in Singapore’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis (Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, 1990), 21; Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 40–96.
41. Bradley Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesia
Relations, 1960–8 (Stanford, CA, 2008); John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th
Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’etat in Indonesia (Madison, WI, 2006).
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1976.42 Malaysian leaders cautiously opened diplomatic relations with the USSR
in the late 1960s to hedge against U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam but they reso-
lutely spurned Brezhnev’s proposal.43
For Russian officials already disappointed by the foundering of their collective
security proposal, the creation of the FPDA promised to close even Singapore and
its naval installations to the USSR’s fleet. The election of the conservative Heath
government in June 1970 had stoked Soviet insecurities.44 And as Bersatu Padu
enjoyed Heath’s belated military supplements that same month, Russian officials
grew shrill, excoriating the FPDA as a “blood relative” of Western defense pacts
like NATO, SEATO, and CENTO.45 Treating Bersatu Padu as evidence that the
FPDA was already up and running, Russian officials rued a missed opportunity.
Well after the exercise concluded, Izvestiya commentaries continued to carp that
Britain’s “imperialist” impulses shone through the FPDA.46
In truth, Bersatu Padu was a pageant starring an empire long gone. Yet it had
bought for Britain, the members of the FPDA, and the United States, what inter-
national relations scholars have called a “political and psychological deterrent” to
rival powers.47 The Russians, apparently at a loss for how to address their strategic
disadvantage in Southeast Asia, continued to issue florid denunciations of the
FPDA apparently fixated on the one extravagant display that was Bersatu Padu.
Almost a year after the exercise, Russian journalist I. Shatalov wrote with dread and
awe about the FPDA and Bersatu Padu in International Affairs, a publication of
Izvestiya’s printing house. He recounted how Britain had moved “two battalions
with engineers, gunners and a signal service, as well as 200 armored carriers, ar-
tillery, 20 helicopters and several thousands of tons of military equipment across
8,000 miles” in only twenty hours. To his mind, Bersatu Padu was a “rehearsal for
[a] future ‘flexible response,’” and the FPDA a full-blown “British-sponsored mili-
tary bloc” that enabled the other “imperialist powers” (meaning the United States)
to dominate Southeast Asia.48 Izvestiya echoed, insisting that the FPDA had
“knocked together a military bloc”—a “mini-NATO”—that preserved British
interests in Southeast Asia while ensuring Singapore’s military facilities served
the U.S. Cold War agenda.49
42. Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 69–70, 72–73, 79, 82.
43. Ang, Southeast Asia, 56–57.
44. Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy, 50.
45. Singh, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 23.
46. V. Matveev, “Krizis Politiki Sily,” Izvestiya, November 10, 1970, quoted in Buszynski,
Soviet Foreign Policy, 50.
47. Emmers, “Role of the Five Power Defense,” 8. Among others, Emmers quotes Ang Wee
Han, “Five Power Defense Arrangements: A Singapore Perspective,” Pointer: Quarterly Journal of
the Singapore Armed Forces 24 (2008): 49–59.
48. I. Shatalov, “At the Junction of Eras and Continents,” International Affairs (April 1971):
93–94.
49. V. Kobysh, “Skolachivayut Voennyi Blok,” Izvestiya, April 17, 1971 quoted in Buszynski,
Soviet Foreign Policy, 51.
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We should expect such hyperbole from the Soviet government’s official pub-
lications. But these responses, given Brezhnev’s failure to sell the Soviet-led secur-
ity system to ASEAN, betrayed Soviet officials’ abiding feelings of inadequacy
when competing with the Anglo-American powers and China for influence in
Southeast Asia. Well before Bersatu Padu, Russian officials had already, perhaps
in a moment of weakness, confided in their American counterparts that Moscow
considered U.S. predominance in Southeast Asia a “desirable” check against
China, their “common enemy” in the region.50 Shatalov’s report about the
FPDA, in combination with the Izvestiya and Pravda commentaries, revealed
(and by repetition likely reinforced) Moscow’s resignation to U.S. hegemony in
the region. In Shatalov’s appraisal, the FPDA had drawn a “gigantic military tri-
angle” in Southeast Asia “in conjunction with the U.S.,” a triangle served by
Masirah, British bases in Singapore, and American military facilities in Diego
Garcia. He also warned that American companies such as Lockheed, which re-
paired military aircraft being used in Vietnam, were poised to establish in
Singapore the “largest commercial aircraft repair center in Southeast Asia.” In
his estimation, the “American military umbrella [would soon] open up over
Figure 2: Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon shake hands in the Grand
Kremlin Palace, thawing relations between their nations with the first Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) agreement on May 26, 1972. Senior Soviet officials had become eager to pursue
rapprochement with the United States following several strategic setbacks in Southeast Asia.
Courtesy of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
50. Telegram, U.S. Embassy (London) to Secretary of State (Washington D.C.), November
1968, LBJL, DDRS.
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Singapore,” and the USSR could expect little more from cultivating relations with
this former stronghold of the British Empire.51 Coupled with this, Britain’s retreat
from the region had Malaysian leaders aggressively seeking U.S. military equip-
ment for their national defense system.52 Izvestiya had foretold in 1968 that the
United States would incorporate Malaysia and Singapore into its sphere of influ-
ence; the FPDA for all its flaws seemed to fulfill this bleak vision.
Despite Britain’s military retreat, the FPDA had unexpectedly enhanced the
United States’ position in Southeast Asia against the USSR. The Soviet Union had
never struggled for hegemony in the region as fervently as the United States, and
Moscow’s belated hopes of winning ASEAN away from the United States had
foundered as well. From the time of Bersatu Padu through the fall of Saigon, Soviet
officials could only broadcast regular condemnations of the ASEAN nations, call-
ing them intimate allies of the United States, inadvertently disclosing Moscow’s
paltry influence in the region outside of Vietnam.53 When Nixon announced in
July 1971 that he would visit China, Soviet leaders were eager to thaw the Cold
War, and primed for the U.S. leader’s triangular diplomacy.54
A N A M E R I C A N E MP I R E O F (FORM ER) DO MIN OES
Like the FPDA did to Soviet ambitions in Southeast Asia, ASEAN leaders’ pro-
U.S. diplomacy thwarted Beijing’s expansionism in the region. It was an open
secret that ASEAN—created in August 1967 with a big push from Indonesia’s
foreign minister Adam Malik—succeeded the Tunku’s explicitly pro-West ASA
(Association of Southeast Asia) that had comprised Malaya, Thailand, and the
Philippines.55 Within a day of ASEAN’s formation, officials of the U.S.
National Security Council (NSC) expressed delight that Indonesia had helped
to establish a grouping of the avowed anticommunist nations of the region. But
U.S. officials had for years worried that the Southeast Asian states were teetering
dominoes in danger of falling to communism, and this anxiety proved hard to
shake in the shadow of Vietnam. Still unsure of how far ASEAN would resist or
accommodate communist influence emanating from Vietnam and China, Assistant
Secretary of State William Bundy modestly pronounced the organization a “good
and promising” development.56
In fact, ASEAN statesmen decidedly cast their lot with the United States in
order to acquire assistance against domestic socialist forces and to obstruct the
51. Shatalov, “At the Junction,” 90, 92, 94.
52. “Fact Sheet—Malaysia,” April 29, 1971, Folder “Chron 1971: Background and Briefings:
Kuala Lumpur,” box 10, RG 59: SFOIMSA, 1965–74, USNA.
53. Singh, Soviet Relations, 40.
54. Telegram, Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 17, 1971Telegram, Dobrynin to the
Soviet Foreign Ministry, July 17, 1971 in Soviet-American Relations, 401–4.
55. Johan Saravanamuttu, Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years—Alignment,
Neutralism, Islamism (Singapore, 2010), 102.
56. Notes of the President’s Meeting with the NSC, 9 August 1967, folder “August 9,
1967—12:20 p.m. NSC,” box 1, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, LBJL.
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expansion of Chinese power in the region. The United States’ immense economic
and military capacity allowed it to wage war in Vietnam at the cost of tens of
billions of dollars a year while still underwriting ASEAN’s rightward tendencies.
This rapidly entrenched what international relations scholar Amitav Acharya has
called the “ideological polarization” of the region.57 When U.S. leaders’ support
for the Saigon government finally waned in the early 1970s, the U.S.-ASEAN
alliance—the wide anticommunist arc—had already encircled China and
Vietnam. Though the Vietnam War remains historically significant, the intensify-
ing collaboration between ASEAN leaders and their American allies to contain
Vietnam and China is more characteristic of the trajectory of the Cold War in
Southeast Asia.
Take the case of Indonesia: Washington and Jakarta’s relationship warmed
rapidly as President Suharto shifted his government further into the American
orbit. In October 1967, the same month that Nixon’s article appeared in Foreign
Affairs, Indonesian leaders suspended diplomatic relations with China, withdrew
their personnel from Beijing, and sent Chinese ambassadorial staff in Jakarta
packing. Adam Malik also informed U.S. officials that Indonesia was solidly
behind the United States’ effort in Vietnam though Jakarta might occasionally
voice muted criticisms of U.S. policy for the sake of appearing neutral.58 These
moves to the right proved profitable for Suharto’s government. By 1970, most of
the expanding private investment pouring into Indonesia, along with generous
loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, came from
the coffers of American businessmen or the U.S. government.59
And when the United States invaded Cambodia in late April 1970, supposedly
to forestall North Vietnamese attacks on South Vietnam from Cambodian sanc-
tuaries, Indonesia spied the chance (as Malik said it would) to burnish its neutralist
credentials and conceal its fervent anticommunism. With Suharto’s blessing,
Malik took a stab at mediating the Cambodian crisis, cobbling together the
Jakarta Conference to, in Suharto’s words, “restor[e] peace in a neighboring coun-
try.” The Indonesian government invited the leaders of ASEAN, India, China,
North Korea, and North Vietnam to convene in Jakarta in mid-May, making a
show of its neutrality with respect to the Cambodian conflict. Indonesian leaders
fully expected the communist states would decline (which they did) but hoped at
least that India would attend and authenticate Indonesia’s claims of neutrality.60
Indian leaders, along with those of many other states invited to Jakarta, would
not be fooled. They refused to attend and insisted the conference was “polarized”
57. Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region (Ithaca, NY,
2013), 161.
58. Ang, Southeast Asia, 49.
59. Memcon (Suharto, Nixon, and Kissinger), May 26, 1970, Folder “MemCon—The
President/Pres. Suharto/ Kissinger, May 26, 1970”, box 1024, NPMS, NSC Files, Presidential/
Henry A. Kissinger (hereafter HAK) Memcons, RMNL.
60. Ang, Southeast Asia, 80–81, 86–87.
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from the outset. In fact, Indonesian leaders had always harbored sympathy for the
anticommunist faction of Cambodia led by General Lon Nol, who in March 1970
had seized power from the neutral (but essentially pro-China) Prince Sihanouk.
Furthermore, Indonesian military leaders had in November 1969 and January
1970 secretly welcomed their Cambodian counterparts to study how Suharto
and the army had executed their coup d’e´tat against the left-leaning Sukarno.
When Lon Nol finally took control of Cambodia, he requested and immediately
received assistance from an Indonesian military mission.61
However genuine Indonesia’s peacemaking efforts, the promise of American
aid whenever Indonesia upheld the U.S. Cold War agenda held the greater appeal
for Suharto. Only ten days after the Jakarta Conference, in pursuit of rewards from
the United States, Suharto bragged to Nixon that he had “nullified” Indonesia’s
communists, that “tens of thousands of these [had] been interrogated and placed in
detention.” He added that Indonesian students had “received indoctrination” to
snuff out their sympathy for communism, fitting them for service in his New
Order.62 As expected, Nixon smiled upon these efforts, tripling the American
Military Assistance Program to Indonesia.63
Suharto also readily accepted Nixon’s challenge to “play a big role in Southeast
Asia,” which he took as a call to openly support the Lon Nol government.64 In
short order, Suharto directed the Indonesian Army to boost Lon Nol’s efforts
against a North Vietnamese invasion that had been launched with Chinese assist-
ance. Indonesia furnished Cambodia with 25,000 AK-47 rifles (and requested the
United States replenish Indonesian caches with American-made weapons), crafted
anti-guerrilla training programs for Cambodian troops, and maintained a brigade
of Indonesian forces to be “projected into trouble-spots” on the Asian mainland
with U.S. air and amphibious support.65 Of course, the communist factions in
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos would eventually triumph in 1975. But the firm
alliance between the United States and the Suharto regime continued to deepen,
strengthening the pro-U.S. dictatorship of the largest state at the center of the
anticommunist arc.
Singapore, the smallest state in the arc, dominated by the authoritarian Prime
Minister Lee’s PAP (the People’s Action Party), also trod the path of alignment
with the United States. Lee and his lieutenants believed it was good business. To
61. Ang, Southeast Asia, 86–87, 80–81.
62. Memcon (Suharto, Nixon and Kissinger), 26 May 1970, folder “MemCon—The
President/Pres. Suharto/ Kissinger, May 26, 1970”, box 1024, NPMS, NSC Files, Presidential/
HAK Memcons, RMNL.
63. Memcon (H. Alamsjah, Indonesian State Secretary and Kissinger), May 27, 1970, folder
“MemCon—Alamsjah/ Kissinger/ Holdridge, May 27, 1970,” box 1024, NPMS, NSC Files,
Presidential/HAK Memcons; “Background—Military Assistance to Indonesia,” May 18, 1970,
folder “Indonesia: President Suharto State Visit, May 26–June 1, 1970 [1 of 2]”, box 919,
NPMS, NSC Files, VIP Visits, RMNL.
64. Memcon (H. Alamsjah, Indonesian State Secretary and Kissinger), May 27, 1970.
65. Memorandum Haig to Kissinger, July 7, 1970, folder “MemCon-Sumitro/Kissinger
(L.A.), July 2, 1970, box 1024, NPMS, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, RMNL.
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bring the island a minor American spending boom, the PAP agreed in February
1966 that U.S. troops from Vietnam could visit Singapore for R&R, a decision that
also presented Lee an opportunity to further undermine his political opponents.66
Indeed, the leftwing politicians and labor unionists that the PAP had persecuted
since the early 1960s were predictably up in arms over the presence of U.S. troops
in Singapore. In May 1966, the labor unions published a tract in Mandarin—since
about 75% of the country was ethnic Chinese—deploring the “PAP puppet re-
gime” and its complicity with the U.S.-British imperialist campaign in Vietnam.67
An attached cartoon depicted Johnson and Lee, arms around each other, the U.S.
leader cradling Lee’s face as if to kiss his pursed lips, while wounded American
soldiers hobbled through Johnson’s comically spread legs toward their “holiday in
Singapore” (dao xing du jia).68 Even then, Lee waited for a more opportune
moment to retaliate, making his move only when his opponents finally gathered
enough momentum to organize public demonstrations. Lee then led the PAP to
swiftly pass a capacious bill against vandalism that—in his own words—targeted
those who “went about shouting and carrying anti-American . . . and pro-Vietcong
slogans;” swamped local newspapers with rulings against printing stories about his
support for U.S. policy in Vietnam; and had the police incarcerate the leaders of
the demonstrations in one fell swoop.69
For Singapore, the richest Asian state after Japan, U.S. intervention in Vietnam
was a money-spinner and the PAP was resolved to scotch any domestic opposition
to the war. By 1967, U.S. officials reported that the “growing volume of U.S.
military procurement for Vietnam in Singapore” accounted for fifteen percent
of the country’s national income. The British bases in Singapore that pumped
some $200 million into the economy contributed only slightly more at twenty
percent.70 Moreover, Singapore served as the regional petroleum-refining center,
which made the city-state indispensable to the U.S. war campaign, opening yet
another substantial revenue stream for the PAP.71 U.S. officials learned as well that
the PAP used its impressive economic record to legitimate and execute its program
66. Ang, Southeast Asia, 28.
67. “Xin jia po ge gong tuan lian he qing zhu wu yi lao dong jie da hui tuan an” [Proposal on
celebration of labor day by the various unions and clubs of Singapore], May 1, 1966, NA 1183,
National Archives of Singapore (hereafter NAS).
68. “Quan xing zuo pai gong tuan lian he qing zhu wu yi guo ji lao dong jie qun zhong da hui ling shi
dong yi” [May Day Commemoration Conference Temporary Motion], May 1, 1966, NA 1183,
NAS.
69. Ang, Southeast Asia, 28–29.
70. Map of British Forces at Bases Overseas, undated (likely February 1968), folder “United
Kingdom: Memos, Vol. 13 [1 of 3],” box 212, NSF-CF—UK, LBJL.
71. Talking Points for Mr. Bundy, December 15, 1965; Briefing Memorandum (Singapore)
for Mr. Bundy—Tab 3: Singapore-United States Economic Relations,” February 17, 1966, folder
“POL 1 General Policy. Background. Singapore 1966,” box 1, SFOIMSA, 1965–74, RG 59,
USNA; CIA, “Singapore on the Eve of Lee Kuan Yew’s Visit to the US,” October 6, 1967,
7–8, CIA FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conver-
sions/89801/DOC_0000261024.pdf, accessed July 14, 2016; Acharya, Making of Southeast Asia,
161.
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of creating a “tightly knit society,” touting the old saw to Singaporeans that only
orderly and stable societies enticed the world’s high-rolling investors. The
Americans knew, though, that “tightly knit” was shorthand for “increasing the
government’s control over the political life of the country.” As proof, the CIA
cited the PAP’s Societies Ordinance of 1966, which like its close cousin the anti-
vandalism bill gave Lee and his team “almost unlimited power to control, approve,
or outlaw” any organization. To boot, the PAP banned public utility strikes to
permanently strangle any leftist activism.72
If the PAP’s tightening vise in Singapore had ever troubled Johnson, it became
a non-issue in October 1967when Lee pledged his “unequivocal” support for U.S.
policy in Vietnam in a personal letter to Johnson. Lee vowed to convince American
opinion-makers that Asian leaders, like himself, genuinely endorsed the Vietnam
War.73 Throughout the final year of the Johnson presidency, Lee used every op-
portunity to insist publicly that “by fulfilling its commitment in Viet-Nam, the
United States was in effect ‘buying time’ for the other nations of Southeast Asia,
permitting them to strengthen their own defenses and economies.”74 And because
Johnson valued Lee’s support, he confided in Lee that “guided by [his] counsel”
the United States would “keep on a steady course in Vietnam.”75
Lee provided the same services to Kissinger and Nixon. The U.S. dollars
pouring into Singapore would offset Britain’s military retreat, ample reason for
Lee to keep the Americans locked into the region. State Department officials had
estimated in 1969 that private American investments in Singapore, given the city-
state’s renowned political stability and blossoming relationship with United States,
were “growing at a phenomenal $100 million per year!”76 Consequently, Lee
proposed to Kissinger that a “statement by an Asian neutral leader, such as him-
self”—though not neutral in reality—“urging the American public not to ‘sell out’
[Saigon] might reduce domestic pressures” on Nixon to withdraw from Vietnam.77
Kissinger heartily recommended Lee to Nixon, who warmly welcomed the offer.78
The United States’ unpopular war in Vietnam had yet other ardent supporters
within ASEAN. Malaysia’s leaders, ever wary of “Chinese pressures” and how the
Vietnamese communists could inspire even the depleted ranks of the Malayan
72. “Singapore on the Eve of Lee Kuan Yew’s Visit to the US,” 5–7.
73. Letter, Lee Kuan Yew to President Johnson c/o Bundy, October 27, 1967, DDRS.
74. “VII. East Asia, J. Malaysia and Singapore,” undated (likely December 1968/ January
1969), 17, folder “Chapter 7 (East Asia): Sections G-J,” box 3, LBJ Papers, Administrative
History (hereafter AH), Department of State (hereafter DOS), vol. I, chaps. 7–9, LBJL.
75. Letter, Johnson to Lee, December 25, 1967, folder “Singapore: Presidential
Correspondence,” box 50, LBJ Papers, NSF—Special Head of State Correspondence, LBJL.
76. “The American Presence in Singapore: Background Paper,” undated (likely 1969), folder
“V.P. Agnew’s Trip—Singapore Visit Briefing Book,” box 83, NSC Files—Henry A. Kissinger
Office Files (hereafter HAKOF), CF—Far East, RMNL, exclamation mark in original.
77. Memorandum for the President, March 19, 1969, folder “Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew
Information Visit, 13 May 1969,” box 938, NPMS, NSC Files—VIP Visits, RMNL.
78. Memorandum (Kissinger to Nixon), undated (likely March 1969), folder “Singapore, Lee
Kuan Yew Information Visit, 13 May 1969,” box 938, NPMS, NSC Files—VIP Visits, RMNL.
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Communist Party, were determined to reinforce the United States’ commitment
to Southeast Asia.79 In any case, the United States was Malaysia’s second largest
export market after Singapore, which saw Malaysian leader Tunku Abdul Rahman
seek all means of strengthening the already warm U.S.-Malaysian ties.80 The
Tunku was one of the more eloquent supporters of U.S. military intervention in
Vietnam. U.S. leaders were especially taken with him since the Johnson adminis-
tration’s “More Flags” campaign had failed to collect many of its allies’ declaration
of support for, and commitment to, Americanizing the Vietnam conflict.81 In
combing through ASEAN leaders’ speeches and writings, U.S. officials drew
cheer from the Tunku’s statement in a July 1965 issue of Foreign Affairs that
“we in Malaysia fully support Washington’s actions” against North Vietnam.
Between 1966 and 1967, the Americans also noted with appreciation that the
Tunku repeatedly affirmed South Vietnam’s “right to defend their territorial in-
tegrity” with American assistance, which made it “imperative” that the United
States “not retire from the scene.” U.S. policymakers probably savored how the
Tunku thundered at the 1967 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in
London that “those who criticize the Americans for their assistance to South
Vietnam should not be blind to the intervention of Communist powers in the
war in Vietnam.”82 With great relief, the State Department reported in 1969
that Malaysia had been a “continuous and forthright supporter of the U.S.
policy in Viet-Nam.”83
Like the leaders of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, Field Marshal Thanom
Kittikachorn, Thailand’s military dictator from 1963 through 1973, firmly com-
mitted his government to the Vietnam War. Thanom’s predecessors had since
1950 taken up the American anticommunist cause, convinced that allying with the
United States would ward off the perceived threat of Chinese communism to Thai
security. As the war in Vietnam escalated, Thanom determined he must hold the
United States even closer, not least because Thailand’s borders ran alongside Laos
and Cambodia, through which the Ho Chi Minh trail snaked. By 1968, the CIA
concluded that Thai leaders had “limited options” for trying out a new patron
“because of [Thailand’s] longstanding and unequivocal commitment to military
alliance with the U.S.,” an alliance the Thai elites admitted to American officials
remained “indispensable” to counter any “threat from China.” On Thanom’s
79. Ang, Southeast Asia, 31–32.
80. “Fact Sheet—Malaysia,” 29 April 1971, Folder “Chron 1971: Background and Briefings:
Kuala Lumpur,” box 10, RG 59, SFOIMSA, 1965–74, USNA.
81. Fredrik Logevall, “There Ain’t No Daylight: Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of
Escalation,” in Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives,
ed. Mark Philip Bradley et al. (Oxford, UK, 2008), 95–96. Here, Logevall refers to Robert M.
Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson’s “More Flags”: The Hiring of Korean, Filipino, and Thai
Soldiers in the Vietnam War (Jefferson, NC, 1994).
82. “Malaysia’s diplomatic support for South Vietnam/ American effort in Vietnam,” undated
(likely late 1967), LBJL, DDRS.
83. “VII. East Asia, J. Malaysia and Singapore,” 17.
“A Wide Anticommunist Arc” : 921
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article-abstract/41/5/903/3090939/A-Wide-Anticommunist-Arc-Britain-ASEAN-and-Nixon-s
by Adam Ellsworth, Adam Ellsworth
on 12 October 2017
watch, Thai troops joined U.S. soldiers in the Vietnamese jungles while American
B-52s bombers flew sorties out of U-Tapao, a Thai airbase near the Gulf of Siam,
to pulverize Vietnam from 1965 through the early 1970s.84 Over that period, U.S.
military intervention in Vietnam pumped some $3.5 billion in military and eco-
nomic aid into Thailand, increasing Thailand’s economic reliance on the United
States and its government’s determination to remain aligned to Washington.85
Even Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos’s attempts to exploit the Vietnam
War for his own political ends tied his fate to U.S. support, ensuring the Philippine
archipelago at the eastern end of the anticommunist arc remained within the
American empire of former dominoes. Ever alert to how he might milk the
United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia, Marcos sensed how desperately
Johnson wanted the Philippines to back the war effort in Vietnam. According to
journalist Stanley Karnow, Macros delayed committing Filipino troops to
Vietnam until September 1966—over a year after U.S. forces had been deployed,
when he thought Johnson most vulnerable. Marcos then promised to raise ten
Filipino battalions (on the American dollar) for Vietnam so long as he could retain
large numbers of these troops for his own protection. Johnson caved, funneling an
additional $80million to Marcos beyond the military subsidy, doing so despite the
fact that Marcos sent just a token force to Vietnam.86 Yet Marcos’s machinations
also made his regime, like Thanom’s, more dependent on American backing. This
state of affairs would only intensify in 1972 when Marcos—desperate to retain
power as his legitimacy dwindled at home—sought U.S. support for his ascension
to dictatorship.87
When President Nixon entered the White House in early 1969, State
Department officials had begun to echo his earlier assertions in Foreign Affairs
about the United States’ strategic advantage in Asia. The State Department’s re-
ports paid close attention to how ASEAN and other regional groups’ “multilateral
undertakings” had “further strengthen[ed] the fabric of non-communist Asia.”
With cautious optimism, they detailed the intersecting organizations that had
incorporated ASEAN into a sprawling network of pro-U.S. and anticommunist
countries. Here are but two of the State Department’s extensive list: Formed in
1965, the Japanese-led Asian Parliamentarians Union plugged ASEAN into co-
operation with Taiwan, Korea, Laos, Australia, India, and New Zealand.
According to the State Department, this organization pooled these countries’ re-
sources for “Free World causes in Southeast Asia”—in effect, U.S. Cold War
objectives in the region. The stridently anticommunist ASPAC (Asian and
84. Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate: Southeast Asia After
Vietnam, 14 November 1968, 9, CIA FOIA Reading Room, accessed 20 January 2015.
85. Acharya, Making of Southeast Asia, 160.
86. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York, 1989),
376–77.
87. Walden Bello, “Edging toward the Quagmire: The United States and the Philippine
Crisis,” World Policy Journal 3 (1985/6): 29–58; H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United
States and the Philippines (Oxford, UK, 1992).
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Pacific Council), formed in 1966, brought together Australia, Taiwan, Japan,
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and
Thailand. ASPAC’s membership intertwined it with ANZUS, ASEAN, the
Asian Parliamentarians Union, the FPDA, and SEATO. No doubt, U.S. officials
sought consolations in Southeast Asia wherever they could. But there is no denying
ASEAN’s collective pro-U.S. bent, barely concealed by some of its members’
disingenuous professions of neutralism. As the State Department acknowledged,
the “bonds between us and the East Asian nations [for their analysis also included
South Korea and Japan] have been strengthened by a variety of contacts.”
Department officials neglected to mention of course that U.S. assistance had
enabled the authoritarian and repressive pro-U.S. governments of the region to
seize and hold power, solidifying the anticommunist arc.88
U.S. officials were not the only ones who appreciated that the East and
Southeast Asian states had woven a complicated security web throughout the
region. Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie may have stated it best in the
London Times in November 1970, when he described how the ASEAN states had
crafted a “crisscrossing network” that collectively strengthened them all. He
pointed to Malaysia’s joint operations with Thailand, which continued to hunt
the tattered bands of Malayan Communist Party fighters along the Malay-Thai
border. He mentioned, too, the “security/military arrangements” that Malaysia
and Indonesia had established for protecting the Sarawak-Kalimantan border in
Borneo. Ghazali even boasted about the FPDA, though he could not have known
how far that defense arrangement and Bersatu Padu had undermined Russian am-
bitions in the region.89
Most crucially, Zhou Enlai discerned the overall pro-U.S. trajectory of
Southeast and East Asia, the crisscrossing economic and security networks that
had advanced U.S. empire further into the region. On March 6, 1969, U.S. intel-
ligence officers reported that Zhou had openly expressed his frustration that China
now “found itself ‘encircled’ . . . and isolated on most key policy issues.”90 Zhou,
who was directly responsible for Chinese foreign policy, would later admit to
Kissinger that he believed “the institutions for [containing China] in Southeast
Asia are more numerous than in any other area in the world.”91 In other words, the
time was ripe for Nixon to subject Chinese leaders to “containment without iso-
lation.” Zhou’s convictions about China’s isolation had already made him
88. “VII. East Asia, A. Overview: Asian Trends and U.S. Policy,” undated (likely December
1968/ January 1969), folder “Chapter 7 (East Asia): Sections A-D,” box 3, LBJ Papers,
Administrative history, Department of State, vol. I, chaps. 7–9, LBJL.
89. M. Ghazali Shafie, “Malaysia in South East Asia” in M. Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia,
International Relations: Selected Speeches (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1982), 160–63.
90. CIA, National Intelligence Estimate: Communist China and Asia, March 6, 1969, 5, CIA
FOIA Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/
DOC_0001085113.pdf, accessed July 14, 2016.
91. Memcon, February 17, 1973, 20, folder “Memcons and Reports (Originals) [TS 1 of 2] (3
of 4),” box 98, NSC Files—HAKOF, CF-Far East, RMNL.
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susceptible to Nixon’s triangular diplomacy. The Sino-Soviet rivalry that subse-
quently exploded into armed clashes merely amplified the urgency of de´tente with
the United States.
Historians of Chinese foreign policy have ignored the role of ASEAN’s pro-
U.S. diplomacy in their attempts to explain senior Chinese leaders’ eagerness for
de´tente with the United States. Privileging Chairman Mao Zedong’s personal
anxieties, they contend that the Sino-Soviet conflict and the chaos of the
Cultural Revolution severely undermined China’s military and paralyzed its dip-
lomacy. These twin pressures, in Arne Westad’s view, made Nixon’s visit to China
a “true godsend” for Mao. The aging, ailing and politically weakened Chinese
leader could then boast that Nixon had “recognized China’s centrality” and sought
his political wisdom. Mao believed this claim could fend off his upstart colleagues
who had been angling to unseat him since the Cultural Revolution.92 Yet this
analysis does not account for Zhou’s perception that the United States and its
Southeast Asian allies had encircled China, especially given that he personally
negotiated the terms of the Shanghai Communique´ with Kissinger and Nixon.
In fact, Zhou was vulnerable to Nixon’s triangular diplomacy because Chinese
foreign policy faced three crises: the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the Cultural Revolution,
and the “wide anticommunist arc” that enclosed the entire South China Sea.
A SE A N ’S NE UTRA LIZA TION PO LICY A ND TH E S HA NG HA I
CO MMUN IQUE´
Ironically, then, ASEAN leaders’ success in limiting Chinese influence and rein-
forcing U.S. predominance in the region had made Sino-American de´tente pos-
sible. But if Nixon’s rapprochement with China disappointed his Southeast Asian
allies, it failed to completely shock them. ASEAN leaders’ faith in the U.S. security
umbrella had been dissolving since at least 1969, when Nixon stated in Guam that,
except in the case of formal treaties with the United States, Washington’s Asian
allies must defend themselves.93 So while ASEAN leaders still encouraged U.S.
policymakers to remain committed to Vietnam and the region through the early
1970s, they also started hedging against U.S. retrenchment.94 To this latter end,
ASEAN leaders undertook diplomatic initiatives to acquire the support of China
and the United States (and to a lesser extent, the USSR) for the neutralization of
Southeast Asia, for keeping the region “free from any form or manner of interfer-
ence by outside Powers.”95 In yet another ironic twist, the ASEAN plan to
92. Westad, Restless Empire, 366–69; Chen, Mao’s China, chap. 9.
93. Richard M. Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with newsmen, July 25, 1969, The
American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140, accessed February
24, 2015.
94. McMahon, Limits of Empire, 170–75.
95. 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration, Center of
International Law, http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/zone.pdf, accessed
February 25, 2015.
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neutralize Southeast Asia, known as ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and
Neutrality), would also facilitate Sino-U.S. rapprochement, for no less than
Zhou would adopt ZOPFAN’s tenets when negotiating the Shanghai
Communique´ with Kissinger and Nixon.
Scholars have traditionally downplayed the significance of the ZOPFAN pro-
posal. They contend that ZOPFAN was a Malaysian “pet project” and that the
other ASEAN members reluctantly signed the ZOPFAN declaration. The
ASEAN leaders were indeed divided over the meaning of neutralization, doubting
that neutralization was even feasible given the superpowers’ lasting designs upon,
and involvement in, Southeast Asia.96 Furthermore, several scholars hold that the
ASEAN states, as smaller powers with limited influence, could never win the
superpowers’ all-important endorsement of their neutralization proposal, so the
ZOPFAN formula “fell on barren ground.”97 In like vein, one historian has argued
that because the “lengthy memoirs” of Nixon and Kissinger do not mention
ASEAN, U.S. leaders must have been “riveted” to the conflict in Indochina and
ignored ASEAN’s “diplomatic gyrations.”98
As such, the widely held view of scholars remains that ASEAN leaders
scrambled to thaw relations with Beijing after Nixon’s July 1971 declaration that
he planned to visit China. And it is true that Nixon’s announcement saw most of
the ASEAN leaders dilute their once impassioned anti-China stance. Thai leaders,
ruing that Nixon had not consulted them on this major policy shift, made friendly
overtures to China with a ping-pong team and a trade mission. Marcos also re-
sentfully took steps to normalize relations with the communist giant. In turn, the
leaders of Malaysia and Singapore emphasized that they had always been non-
aligned (despite their track record) so as to establish trade and diplomatic contacts
with China. Only Indonesia proved reluctant to turn in that direction.99
Yet a substantially different story hides in plain sight within the transcripts of
the historic meetings between Zhou, Kissinger, and Nixon. Revisiting these re-
cords while bearing in mind the wide anticommunist arc and its impact upon
Zhou’s worldview reveals instead ASEAN’s considerable influence upon the cen-
tral principles of Sino-U.S. rapprochement. In this, the diplomatic efforts of
ASEAN statesmen to promote ZOPFAN—the Malaysians in particular—were
crucial. From 1970 through 1971, the new Malaysian Prime Minister Tun
Abdul Razak and his colleagues advocated for the principles of ZOPFAN in mul-
tiple international forums, believing the heightened visibility of their neutraliza-
tion proposal would gain international support and catch Beijing’s attention. In
April 1970, Ghazali asked the nonaligned nations gathered at Dar es Salaam,
96. McMahon, Limits of Empire, 174; Bilveer Singh, ZOPFAN and the New Security Order in the
Asia-Pacific Region (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1992), 58–61; Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the
ZOPFAN Concept (Singapore, 1991), 37–38.
97. Hanngi, ZOPFAN Concept, 38; Singh, ZOPFAN, 55, 59.
98. McMahon, Limits of Empire, 175.
99. McMahon, Limits of Empire, 172–75.
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Tanzania, to “endorse the neutralization not only of the Indochina area but of the
entire region of Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the three major powers,” the United
States, USSR, and China. Five months later, Razak requested that all the nations at
the nonaligned summit in Lusaka, Zambia, support Malaysia’s proposal for neu-
tralizing Southeast Asia. In October 1970, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun
Ismail addressed the United Nations and called for “neutralization not only of the
Indochina area but also of the entire region of Southeast Asia,” again to be
“guaranteed by the three superpowers.” The Malaysians were relentless. In
January 1971, Razak took his proposal to the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting in Singapore and argued again for neutralization and the
“endorsement of the U.S., USSR and China.” Ismail then made the same case at
the ASEAN Ministerial Conference in Manila in March 1971. In October, Razak
delivered what he hoped was the clincher at the UN General Assembly.100 The
next month, in Kuala Lumpur, Razak pressed other ASEAN members to sign off
on the ZOPFAN proposal.101
More than they knew, the Malaysians’ campaign for ZOPFAN and badgering
of other ASEAN leaders to support the proposal captured Zhou’s imagination. In
fact, Zhou would later tell Kissinger that having learned of ZOPFAN’s principles
he soon came to believe they were a “good tendency” for the region. In addition, he
shared with Kissinger that the ASEAN leaders (with the exception of the
Indonesians) had preempted Nixon’s visit and “asked our opinion” about their
plans to “embark on a road of neutrality.”102 Despite their reservations about
ZOPFAN, almost all the ASEAN leaders had peddled the proposal to Beijing.
Though the ASEAN leaders viewed ZOPFAN as a way to cope with U.S.
withdrawal from the region, Zhou welcomed the proposal as an unexpected con-
cession from the United States’ allies. From a position of strength that they did not
fully appreciate, ASEAN leaders had offered Beijing a way to endure containment
without isolation. And as we shall see below, the thrust of Zhou’s discussions with
Kissinger and Nixon from 1971 through 1972 signals that the Chinese premier was
enamored with the ZOPFAN principles. Chinese records of the Zhou-Kissinger
talks in October 1971, for example, show that Zhou even went against the heated
objections of Mao to ensure that ZOPFAN’s main ideas were featured in the draft
of Shanghai Communique´.103 American accounts of the Zhou-Nixon discussions
100. Singh, ZOPFAN, 35–40.
101. Hanngi, ZOPFAN Concept, 16; Ghazali Shafie, “Neutralization of South East Asia” in
Malaysia, International Relations, 171–77. Ghazali’s article originally appeared in an October 1971
issue of the journal Pacific Community (known later as Asia Pacific Community, an Asian quarterly
that ran between 1969 and 1978).
102. Record of Discussion: Henry Kissinger/ Zhou Enlai – June 21, 1972, folder “February
1973 Briefing Book [TS] (1 of 4),” box 98, NSC Files—HAKOF, CF-Far East, RMNL.
103. “Kissinger’s Second Visit to China in October 1971,” trans. Gao Bei, Xin Zhongguo
Waijiao Fengyun [Main Diplomatic Events of New China], vol. III, 59–70, Digital National
Security Archive (hereafter DNSA), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB70/doc21.pdf,
accessed April 13, 2016.
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of February 1972 indicate that Zhou equated the spirit of ZOPFAN with the
Shanghai Communique´’s signature declaration that “neither [the United States
nor China] seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region” and would oppose efforts
by another power (meaning the USSR) to “establish such hegemony.”104
Figure 3: Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak visits President Richard Nixon on
October 5, 1971, to discuss Malaysia’s plan to neutralize Southeast Asia. In fact, Razak had already
promoted the concept at the UN General Assembly four days earlier, and soon after prevailed
upon ASEAN leaders to issue the ZOPFAN declaration. Courtesy of the Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum.
104. Record of Discussion: President/ Chou En-Lai—Feb. 22, 1972 and Feb. 24, 1972, folder
“February 1973Briefing Book [TS] (1 of 4),” box 98, NSC Files, HAKOF, CF—Far East, RMNL.
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At base, Zhou discerned in ZOPFAN a minor boost to China’s status, for it
implied that the United States would recognize China as a worthy guarantor of
Southeast Asian neutrality, as an equal superpower. Historian Chen Jian has shown
that Beijing had always aspired for “recognition as a central part of the world
revolution,” its “constant aim” was to be seen as an “equal partner” with
Moscow.105 By extension, Zhou must have reasoned that the ZOPFAN prin-
ciples—once embedded within the Shanghai Communique´—would publicly
shore up China’s status as a legitimate great power, one that like the United
States’ could deign to eschew hegemonic ambitions (despite the reality of
China’s limited influence beyond Indochina).
American and Chinese records show that even the simple task of phrasing the
forswearing of hegemony was a contentious affair. While Kissinger’s report to
Nixon from October 1971 took no credit for formulating this statement in the
draft communique´, Chinese records maintain that the Americans had coined it
and, importantly, that Mao loathed it.106 Though Mao had been keen to meet
Nixon and get Sino-U.S. rapprochement underway, he turned out to be the big-
gest obstacle to Zhou’s and Kissinger’s efforts to draft the communique´ in October
1971. Chinese accounts detail how Mao treated Zhou to withering rebukes that the
Americans were “all empty talk” about renouncing hegemony. Mao insisted that
Zhou craft the communique´ to instead “emphasize revolution, liberating the op-
pressed nations and peoples in the world.” The chairman wanted to excise “empty
talks” (sic) from the communique´ because if the United States “did not seek he-
gemony, how could America expand from 13 states to 50 states?” As Mao ex-
claimed that the Americans had “tried to expand to the whole world,” Zhou
deflected the tirade by promising to “revise the draft per the chairman’s advice.”
However, over the next three days while redrafting the communique´ and holding
discussions with Kissinger, Zhou and his aide, Xiong Xianghui, contrived to only
alter or add other statements to the communique´, leaving unchanged the ones to
which Mao had vehemently objected. Zhou eventually secured Mao’s approval of
the revised draft, though it is unclear why Mao now appeared to believe that the
draft communique´ was “good and had a voice.”107
Having circumvented Mao’s objections, Zhou met Nixon four months later
with the intention of persuading the American president to accept his particular
conflation of neutralizing Southeast Asia with both powers’ disavowal of hegem-
ony in the region. On February 22, 1972, the second day of Nixon’s visit, Zhou
borrowed phrases from ZOPFAN repeatedly, expressing his fervor for neutraliz-
ing Southeast Asia until Nixon finally responded that he, too, “would accept the
105. Chen, Mao’s China, 63.
106. Memorandum from Kissinger to the President, October 26, 1971, Foreign Relations of the
United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. XVII, China (Washington, DC) available online
at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d165, last accessed on April 13,
2016; “Kissinger’s Second Visit to China in October 1971,” Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Fengyun.
107. “Kissinger’s Second Visit to China in October 1971,” Xin Zhongguo Waijiao Fengyun.
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idea [Zhou] referred to as a neutralized area” so long as China upheld the “deal” in
concert with the United States.108
The transcript for that day’s talks ends there with Nixon’s assent, ostensibly
a product of Zhou’s assertiveness and Nixon’s deference to Zhou. For, despite
Nixon’s confidence in the anticommunist arc, he approached Zhou as well as
Mao with some trepidation, making it easier for Zhou to advocate for the
ZOPFAN principles. After all, Nixon’s director of Central Intelligence as
well as the NSC had repeatedly emphasized China’s tremendous politico-mili-
tary heft, since China possessed the “largest land army in the world” that could
“overrun its smaller neighbors in Asia” in addition to a “growing nuclear po-
tential” that unnerved even the Soviets.109 Kissinger, too, counseled that Nixon
must impress the “truly imposing and formidable pair” of Mao and Zhou, and
match their “broad philosophic touch” on the “strategic outlines” of world
affairs or else risk looking “flaccid” to these “fanatic and pragmatic” Chinese
leaders. He warned Nixon that, above all, Mao and Zhou would be “sizing you
up” based upon whether “you understand their view [and if] your own policy
framework [is] compatible with theirs?”110 In the thick of his discussions with
Zhou, Nixon likely calculated that he must concur with the Chinese leader’s
determination to neutralize Southeast Asia, both to communicate he was
Zhou’s equal in strategic thought as well as to thaw Sino-U.S. relations. At
the same time, Nixon would have perceived that the neutralization proposal
would enable the United States to retreat from Vietnam while retaining de facto
hegemony in Southeast Asia due to its entrenched political, military, and eco-
nomic ties with the ASEAN countries.
On February 24, when Zhou returned to the topic of neutralizing Southeast
Asia, Nixon was ready to meet him halfway. Zhou stated that the United States and
China must together help the Southeast Asian states “bring about an area of peace
and neutrality,” the essence of ZOPFAN, and Nixon agreed. Zhou then insisted
that these aspirations must feature in their joint communique´, which would soon
be made public, to which Nixon voiced no objections. At this point, merging the
ZOPFAN principles with the Shanghai Communique´, Zhou read aloud from the
draft that “neither [China nor the U.S.] should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
108. Record of Discussion: President/ Chou En-Lai—Feb. 22, 1972 and Feb. 24, 1972, folder
“February 1973Briefing Book [TS] (1 of 4),” box 98, NSC Files, HAKOF, CF—Far East, RMNL,
italics added.
109. Richard Helms, DCI Briefing for NSC Meeting: Communist China, August 12, 1969,
folder “NSC Meeting (San Clemente) August 14, 1969, Briefings: Korea, China [2 of 3],” Box
H-023, NPMS, NSC Institutional (“H”) Files, Meeting Files (1969–74), NSC Meetings;
Memorandum, Richard H. Solomon to Kissinger, December 7, 1971, 1, 7, 8, folder “PRC/
Briefing Papers Sent to President, February 1972 [1 of 2]”, box 91, NSC Files, HAKOF,
CF—Far East, RMNL.
110. Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, February 5, 1972, 2, 7, 8, folder “PRC/ Briefing
Papers Sent to President, February 1972 [1 of 2]”, box 91, National Security Council (NSC)
Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files (Kissinger Office Files), Country Files—Far East, RMNL.
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region,” and both affirmed they would oppose others that attempted to “establish
such hegemony.”111
Four days later, both the American and Chinese governments publicized the
Shanghai Communique´. And when Nixon arrived at Andrews Air Force Base in
Maryland on the night of February 28, 1972, he called his visit to China a “journey
of peace,” explaining that this was why he and the Chinese had agreed to “oppose
[the] domination of the Pacific by any one power.”112 In reality, the United States’
remained by far the dominant power in that region. The tortured American with-
drawal from Vietnam would remove only the most visible sign of American he-
gemony in Southeast Asia, leaving the wide anticommunist arc largely intact,
tantamount to a U.S. neocolonial system that stretched through most of the
region.
Just as important, the salient principles of the Shanghai Communique´ carried
the spirit of the ZOPFAN declaration. More than just Zhou lifting choice phrases
Figure 4: President Richard Nixon shaking hands with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai amid a
crowd at Hung Chiao Airport on February 28, 1972, the final day of his historic trip to China. In
the days before this picture was taken, Zhou repeatedly brought up the neutralization of Southeast
Asia in discussions with Nixon, drawing from the ZOPFAN concept. Courtesy of the Richard
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
111. Record of Discussion: President/ Chou En-Lai—Feb. 22, 1972 and Feb. 24, 1972, folder
“February 1973Briefing Book [TS] (1 of 4),” box 98, NSC Files, HAKOF, CF—Far East, RMNL.
Italics added.
112. Nixon, Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base on Returning from the People’s Republic of
China, February 28, 1972, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=3756&st=nixon&st1=china, accessed November 20, 2015.
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from ZOPFAN to discuss with Nixon, these parallels represented an ironic coin-
cidence of ASEAN and Chinese agendas. While the deepening U.S.-ASEAN re-
lationship had contained Chinese influence and power, the ASEAN neutralization
proposal offered the Chinese leadership an escape from complete isolation. Little
wonder, then, that Zhou readily adopted the ZOPFAN principles when he learned
of them from the ASEAN leaders or that he labored to persuade Nixon of their
value when they finally met face-to-face. The efforts of ASEAN leaders had dir-
ectly shaped the agendas and actions of the superpowers.
Yet to hear Nixon tell it, to see how photographs captured this first leg of his
triangular diplomacy (Nixon shaking hands with Mao on the cover of Time; Nixon
raising a toast to Zhou on Newsweek), one may be tempted to think that only the
statesmen of the big powers had brought de´tente into reality.113 As mentioned
above, major studies of Nixon’s triangular diplomacy have reached similar con-
clusions. They offer a range of explanations for the American, Chinese, and Soviet
leaders’ motivations for reaching de´tente, usually centered on conservative at-
tempts to preserve the Cold War order against the destabilizing shocks of global-
ization and the Vietnam War (in the case of the United States) and burgeoning
internal dissent (as with the USSR, China, and the United States).
This article offers an alternate perspective, one that contends that the United
States achieved hegemony in Southeast Asia despite its failures in Vietnam. By the
time of Nixon’s presidency, Soviet and Chinese leaders actually viewed their stra-
tegic shortcomings in Southeast Asia vis-a`-vis the United States more acutely than
U.S. officials fixated with Vietnam. For the Soviets, the recognition that their
politico-military reach did not extend beyond Indochina’s borders was intensified
by the creation of the FPDA, which though fragile in reality, nevertheless con-
vinced Russian officials that they had been shut out of most of Southeast Asia. The
success of Nixon’s efforts to thaw relations with China merely ensured that Soviet
leaders became more disposed to triangular diplomacy. Likewise, senior Chinese
leaders such as Zhou and Mao had been eager for de´tente with the United States.
As this article shows, Zhou specifically held that the United States and its allies had
effectively circumscribed Chinese influence, and that China was in danger of com-
plete isolation from world affairs. After all, ASEAN’s pro-U.S. diplomacy, with
willing and generous patrons in presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M.
Nixon, had produced a wide anticommunist arc that enclosed the entire South
China Sea. Nixon’s bold execution of triangular diplomacy, therefore, arose from a
position of U.S. predominance in the Asia Pacific. Furthermore, ASEAN leaders’
attempts to neutralize the region against the Cold War rivalry directly influenced
the Shanghai Communique´, offering China recognition as an equal superpower to
the United States and Zhou a formula for escaping isolation. Absent the roles of
the FPDA and ASEAN, the story of Nixon’s triangular diplomacy remains
113. Another example, in addition to Westad’s Restless Empire and Chen’s Mao’s China and the
Cold War, is Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–74: From “Red
Menace” to “Tacit Ally” (Cambridge, UK, 2005).
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incomplete, even inaccurate. In this light, certainly, Nixon’s exhortation in Foreign
Affairs to turn our gaze to the “rest of Asia,” away from the distortions to analysis
created by the Vietnam War, offers a new understanding of this pivotal moment in
the intertwined histories of British decolonization, Southeast Asian regionalism,
and U.S. empire in the Cold War.
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